THE JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MECHANISM OF SECTION 77
L

IE CRwAVN*

Among the most important amendments to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
proposed at the last two sessions of Congress, are those which involve what court
shall be charged with the performance of the judicial functions in the administration
of the Act, and what shall be the relative functions of this judicial tribunal and the
Interstate Commerce Commission. These amendments, and the considerations
underlying them, are the subject of this discussion.
Such legislation must, of course, be framed with a recognition of the inherent
peculiarities of the work at hand. One of the most important of these peculiarities is
that the reorganization of a railroad affects the public interest. The public is interested in the unimpaired capacity of the railroad to render efficient and economical
service. An unreasonable capital structure, which burdens the property with excessive
charges and threatens it with financial disruption, is clearly inconsistent with that
public interest. As a corollary, the public interest requires the provision of a capital
structure which will contribute to the good credit of the railroad and thus permit
securing the necessary new capital from time to time through appropriate mediums
for future financing. It has been generally conceded that the equity reorganizations
effected before the passage of Section 77 did not adequately meet these necessities,
and this was one of the reasons offered for the enactment of the section. Actually, the
public interest also requires such a reorganization of the physical operations of the
property as will tend to improve and protect its economic integrity by releasing it
from the deadweight of unproductive facilities through abandonments and from
excessive competition through, consolidations. If the process were rightly arranged,
this kind of physical reorganization would precede or accompany the corporate reorganization. But the domination of legislation for the railroads by labor, and the
politicians' willingness that the economic efficiency of the property be sacrificed for
the protection and providing of employment, apparently makes such action impossible. Attention is thus beinggiven only to corporate reorganizations, whereas atten"A.B., x909, J.D.. 1911, Leland Stanford University. Member of the New York Bar. Member of the
firm of Miller, Owen, Otis & Bailly, New York City. As counsel for Joseph B. Eastmans, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, proposed the comprehensive revisions of Section 77 enacted by Congress in
1935; in 1939 appeared in hearings on S. 1869, as representative of creditor interests; professor of law,
Duke University Law School, 1932-1934; valuation counsel of western railroads, z98-1932. Contributor
to legal periodicals.
'Bankruptcy Act, S77, ts U. S. C. A., S205 (hereinafter referred to as "Section 77").
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tion should likewise be directed to operating reorganizations designed to effect
economic stability. The assumption thus is that, regardless of the shallowness of the
water, you can make a boat float by merely reducing its draft, that soundness can be
created by reducing capitalization without increasing the earnings.
A second major aspect of railroad reorganizations is the technical nature of the
questions involved in the determination of the size and character of the new corporate
structure and of the allocation to the claimants entitled to participate of the securities
permitted under the authorized capitalization. The fundamental question is what
economic substance presently and prospectively exists in the property and how that
substance may fairly be divided among those security owners whose interests have
not been wiped out by irremediable shrinkage of the economic substance. While
legal questions are involved, the answer rests primarily in very technical fact considerations. These have to do with such issues as the cost, value and earning power
of the property as a whole, and of the component parts separately subject to the
various mortgage liens. The value of the component parts must be weighed both
from the standpoint of what they contribute to the railroad system as a whole and
what value they would have if severed. Similar analysis and conclusions as to terminal properties and leased lines are necessary. These issues are technical and involve
considerations peculiar to the industry. It would be a mistake to regard them as
primarily, or simply, legal questions, to be readily handled by a court not familiar
with the railroad technique.
These considerations indicate that the aid of a trained and technical agency is
required for the best administration of these cases. When Section 77 was enacted,
it was believed that the courts had shown themselves unable to discern the unsoundness of plans presented to them by persuasive private groups not primarily concerned
with the public interest. The courts had been too much inclined to approve, without
careful scrutiny, plans accepted by large votes of the controlling interests. Consequently Section 77 required the Interstate Commerce Commission to pass on all of
the elements of the plan. Because of its experience and its other similar functions,
the Commission was the natural choice of Congress. The Commission was given an
important role. Under the provisions of Section 77, the court can approve a plan only
when it has had the Commission's approval.2 Plainly, this arrangement secures the
desired reform. But it has the defect tfiet the required concurrence of the two
separate agencies upon the plan may result in delay. While, in the hearings before
the House and Senate committees, no one was able, nor attempted, to establish that,
in any of the relatively simple cases which by now have reached the courts, there
actually has been substantial delay because of such disagreement, the arrangement
probably does involve some hazard. Should there be such a dual responsibility in
both the Commission and the court? In view of the technical character of the determinations, should they be entrusted to the federal district courts or to a special
court?
'S77(d).
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The several bills presented to the House propose different answers. S. z869 which
passed the Senate in 1939 was prepared by the legal staff employed by the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in connection with its investigations
of railroad financing- and has becn under consideration by the House Committee on
the Judiciary at the present session. It vests in the Commission the determination of
those elements of the plan which affect the public interest, which determination
shall be final if sustained by substantial evidence 3 This framework is to be prescribed
by the Commission after hearings to be held before any plans are submitted to the
court. The Commission is specifically enjoined to disregard the questions pertaining
to the distribution of the authorized securities to the various classes of creditors and
stockholders and is to make its determination of the detail of the capital structure
in abstraco.4 With this prescription of the capital structure before it, the court then
holds hearings and considers the provisions of the plan allocating the authorized
securities to the respective claimants, without the benefit of the Commission's views
as to that phase of the reorganization. 5
While Section 77 vests jurisdiction in the ordinary -federal district courts, S. 1869
provides for a special reorganization court composed of five members,6 to be located
at Washington,7 and to combine both administrative and judicial functions, the court
being empowered to promulgate its own reorganization plans.8 The theory of the
bill is that a specially qualified court can properly be substituted for the specially
qualified commission in handling this part of the plan.
The bill 9 proposed for the consideration of the Judiciary Committee by Hon.
Walter Chandler (formerly chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and
Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciary) is quite different. It
assumes that the primary responsibility for the reorganization should be placed in the
court, which, however, shall act with the advice of the Commission. The Commission is required to hold hearings and to pass on all the elements of the plan. 10 The
court is then free to approve a plan in disregard of the Commission's1 1 report.
Plainly, the purpose of this proposal is to secure expedition through the elimination
*577(d), as amended by S. x869, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939), p. 40, provides that the Commission
at the initiation of the reorganization shall determine the expectable future average income upon which a
plan may safely be based and the maximum total capitalization, fixed charges, amount of fixed interest
bearing debt, cumulative contingent charges, non-cumulative contingent charges, amount of contingent
interest bearing debt, and cumulative dividend requirements. Such determinations are basic to the
reorganization standards set forth in subsection (u) and, when fixed, would definitely fix the capital
1 .1
structure.
The page references to S. x869, herein, are to the House Committee Print of June x, 5939, a Comparative Print of S. 1869 as it passed the Senate and existing law.
' 177_(d), as amended by S. 1869, p. 41.
4S. 1869, 5a(a), p. a.
"Id., pp. 42-43.
'Id. S53, p. 78.
'Id. 53, P. 5.
* Committee Print of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House, entitled "A Bill to Amend Section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act by Substituting Chapter XVI Therefor," 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (hereinafter
referred to as the "Chandler-Draft").
1
1d. 949, P.59, 5951, P. 60.
" Chandler Draft, 943, P. 57.
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of the need of any concurrence between the court and the Commission, and through
the substitution of the primary responsibility of the court for a dual responsibility in
both the court and the Commission.
Mr. Chandler's draft would also materially strengthen the court's own machinery,
but without going outside the existing structure. It does this by providing for a
special three-judge court to be convened in each case, two members to be circuit
judgesl-a provision similar to the special court procedure now employed in injunction cases.
H. R. 9447, introduced in the House by Hon. Charles F. McLaughlin who succeeded Mr. Chandler as chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the House Committee on the judiciary, presents another alternative.
It adopts the three-judge court proposed by Mr. Chandler33 and reaches a midway
position with reference to the functions of the court and the Commission. Al of the
testimony as to the plan is to be heard before the Commission and the Commission
is to state in its report findings prescribing substantially the same elements of the
capital structure as are required in S. 1869.'4 These findings as to the public-interest
aspects of the plan "shall be prima facie conclusive and every presumption of correctness shall be indulged in favor of such findings. '15 The findings of the Commission with reference to the allocation of the authorized securities among the claimants
are protected by no such presumption, and the court is left free to modify the plan or
to approve a different plan, as it may find to be required by the facts or the law.'5
H. R. 9447, based upon the subcommittee's consideration of the several bills just
discussed and the testimony heard by the subcommittee in protracted hearings at
which there was a full presentation of views, is apt to be reported out favorably by
the House Committee on the Judiciary and to be considered by the House as the
basis of future legislation.
What form such legislation should take is now a question to be considered in
light of the present advanced status of the pending cases. The weighing on a theoretical plane of the advantages of a technically informed commission as compared with
a special and technically informed court must be subordinated to the practical considerations that we now have a technically informed and fully staffed commission
fully functioning on reorganization matters and that there would be delays as well as
hazards (due to the chances of the selection of inappropriate personnel) were a
special court now to be established. By the time Congress adjourns this year, theCommission will have certified to the respective courts its completed plans in cases
involving 9o% of the mileage of the railroads in bankruptcy.17 In the hearings before
1

1d. at. VII, p. 20.
'RH. R. 9447, art. VIL p. x6.
sId., P. 47.
1

'Id.

S943, PP. 46-47.

"Id. $949, P. 48, 5951, p. 50-

" House Hearings, PL 2, p. 239-240. The references herein to "House Hearings" are to the Hewing

be/ore the Specidal Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the Committee on the Judciary,
House of Representatives, on S. r869, 76th Cong, Ist Sess. (1939) Ser. No. iX.
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the Senate and House committees there appeared reprcsentatives of the trustees, the
stockholders, the creditors, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the labor unions,
aid the staff which has conducted the investigations into railroad finance carried on
by the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, among others. None of these interests
made any attack on the soundness of the general principles employed by the Commission in its work. Were the Commission's principles fundamentally unsound, or
consistently unfair to any of the various interests thus represented, the fact would
have been made known. It is true that S. 1869 provid-'s new standards which would
base the capitalization on the capitalized earnings of the last twelve years, 18 and
which would produce reductions on the capitalization exceeding the drastic reductions which have been made by the Commission. But this proposal was so poorly
supported by the Senate committee staff as to receive no support from any other
interest, and falls far -short of demonstrating the unsoundness of the Commission's
work. Practically then, there seems to be little ground for substituting at this time a
special judicial agency for this technical quasi-judicial agency, as S. i869 proposed.
Nor can any very accurate conclusions be drawn with reference to whether a plan
which looks for technical skill to a special court is preferable to one which relies upon
a commission; because, while the question is readily debatable and the theoretical
considerations pro and con fairly obvious, such considerations are actually outweighed by the practical question of what men the appointive power would select
for such a new court-and that no man knoweth, not even a clairvoyant. It is, of
course, the motivation, energy, and intelligence of the men who constitute such
agencies which fix their standard of performance. Of this, the ill-fated Commerce
Court is proof. However theory may have indicated the expected efficiency with
which it might have accomplished its purpose, the personnel selected was, apparently, actually responsible for its failure. The Interstate Commerce Commission
is a trained and experienced agency of fifty years' experience, and has that intimate
knowledge of the railroad problem which no court, even if a special court, could
have initially or could attain without long training and experience. It is, .further,
above politics and it, and its friends, have vigorously resisted any attempt to subvert
its objective-mindedness, the significance of which will appear from consideration
of the apparent' purposes of some of the proponents of a special court.
Whatever might be the merits of a speciaI court, as an original question to have
been considered in 1933, certainly the particular kind of special court proposed in
S. i869 and as explained by Mr. Max Lowenthal who drafted the bill, had nothing
to recommend it. The purpose of S. i869 was the reorganization of the railroads
according to new standards which were prescribed in the bill 9 and which were so
drastic as to have required the rejection of all that the Commission bad done and
the rewriting of its plans according to newly imposed standards. The drastic capital
reductions intended to be accomplished by this program are indicated by the table
"' §77(u)(3), as amended by S. x869, P. 75.

a dS77(u), as amended by S. z869, pp. 73-77.
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in tile footnote.2 0 If such a destruction of property values has actually occurred and

should now be recognized in a reduced capital structure, the reductions should be
made in accordance with the law of the land. But they should be made by the
objective-minded processes of a judiciary free from political pressure. The essence
of the railroad problem lies in the simple issue whether, under the democratic process
with its criss-cross of tensions from pressure groups, our railroad regulation can ex-*
press enough intelligence to allow the railroads to survive. Railroad labor, whose
political power enables its domination of railroad legislation, is manifesting .an active
interest in the reorganization of the railroads 21 on the assumption, supposedly, that a
marked reduction of railroad debt and fixed charges will allow the diversion to the
wage earners of a greater part of the railroad earnings. Against this background,
Mr. Lowenthal's blunt explanation of the purpose of a special court stands in bold
relief. He said before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce:
In the second place, this special court will be functioning in Washington, to a large
extent, immediately under the eye of Congress. Whatever one may want to say of it, I
think it is fair to say that that has a salutary effect.2
Such a court would be under the eye of Congress with respect to a matter of national
conccrn, because I think that what has been said so far this morning has made it quite
plain that sound railroad reorganization is a matter of national concern.2 s
Table taken from House Hearings,P. 2, p. 243, being a comparison of the capitalization authorized
in reorganization plans by the Interstate Commerce -Commission or its examiners, with the 12-year carnings capitalization basis as -proposed in S. x869, and the Interstate Commerce Commission valuation.
Common
Interstate Commerce
Commission or exrport
ane'sni

Bonds and
preferred

no-par stock.
numler
of shares

Commission

12-year aver-

ag capitalized at 5 percent per-

(S. 1869)

cost of reproduction
an&
p

and working
capital

(1)
Milwaukee ..........
Northwestern ........

Rock Island .........
Erie ................
Missouri Pacilic .......

Examiner ............
Interstate Commerce

Commission.
Examiner ............
do ...............
Interstate Commerce

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

$339,489,000
329,074,000

2,915,214
1,2o8,998

$249,680,000
-:246,ooo,ooo

$648,659,000
656,298,ooo

179,357,000
251,359,000
423,722,500

1,271,406

1,367,846

2i1,79oooo
277,560,000
343,160,000

421,546,000
385,070,000
494,920,000

365,ooo,oo .............
621,022
177,898,000
319,441
65,89,0ooo

347,790,000
190,920,000
33,250,000

423,520,000
244,119,000
98,956,000

2,554,736

Commission.
Examiner .............
New Haven ..........
do.. : ............
Frisco .................
Western Pacific ....... Interstate Commerce

Commission.
Total capitalization.
NoMr.-The data in columns (2) and (3) were secured from the Bureau of Finance and are taken from the
rports of the Commission and its examiners. The data in columns (4) and (5) arc taken from the table
found on page 779 of the printed hearings before the House committee.

2, House Hearings, rt. 1, pp. 487 et seq., 594 Cl seq., 707 et seq.
"'Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. s869,
(1939) 114.

"ibid.

7 6th

Cong., sst Scss.
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I think there is great value, however, in giving a court that is under the eye of Congress
the responsibility for seeing that things go well even in the small matters, the so-called
local matters.24
This court, from Washington, would have supervised the actual operation of 30%
of the mileage of the country, such bureaucratic and centralized responsibility apparently being regarded as desirable for the right conduct of "local matters."
In order to accomplish the purposes of the proposed legislation, this "court" was
to be half court and half administrative agency, was to combine both judicial and
nonjudicial functions, provision being made that the "court" should have power to
promulgate its own plans for the reorganization.2 5 It was to be staffed with a bureau
of experts, legal and otherwise, in order that it might perform its nonjudicial
functions.2 6 The proposal that the "court" promulgate its own plans was unconstitutional. Nonjudicial functions cannot be conferred upon the "constitutional" courts
of the United States, that is, upon the courts which are the depository of the judicial
power of the government, a power which, under Section i of Article III of the Constitution "shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."2 7 The court proposed would
dearly have been a constitutional court in this sense.2 8
This confusion of functions was, it seems, thoroughly undesirable. The "court"
would have been empowered by the statute to "promulgate its own plans" for submission to itself. They necessarily would be adverse to the interests of many of the
parties appearing before it. This impairment of the judicial function, together with the
proposed deliberate subjection of the court to political influence, deprived the proposal of the support of practically all those who appeared before the House committee.29 The proposal was to sacrifice sound principle for power.
There is no apparent reason to set up a special court now for the purpose of this
litigation. It is better to strengthen the judicial machinery without going outside
the existing structure. Mr. Chandler's proposal of a three-judge court was incorporated without substantial change in H. R. 9447, which provides for the creation of
a special court in each case by the addition to the district judge of two circuit judges'
This proposal comes from, the precedent of the procedure in injunction suits. The
district judge continues in the administration of the operation of the property, and
has the support of two circuit judges upon the approval of the plan,8 1 the tentative
form of which is prepared by the district judge, 3 2 and upon other major problems of
especial difficulty, such as the selection of the trustees, s the allowance of compensa" Id. at 123.
25S. x869, S13, P. 78.
s'Id. S2, p. 3.
"Keller v. Potomac Electric Company, 261 U. S. 428 (1923); Muskrat v. U. S., 2t9 U. S. 346 (1911);
Gordon v. U. S., i17 U. S. 697 (x864).
" Er parfe Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S.438 (i929); O'Donoghue v. U. S.,289 U. S. 561 (1933).

For a thorough argument with reference to the various phases of the proposal of S. 1869, see House Hearings, Pt. 2, P. 237.
"IId., p. 248.
"'H. R. 9447, S851. p. x6.
S: Id. SS950-953, PP. 49-52.
" Id

S949, P. 49.

*Id. art. IX, pp. 17-2o.
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tion and expenses3 4 and other important matters upon which the district judge may
seek assistance.:" Within the existing judicial structure, the hand of the court is
strengthened. This is enough where the Commission, as a technical agency, long
experienced, has brought to the consideration of the plans that technical insight
which theoretically might be possessed by a special court.
What then should be the scope of the Commission's function? Should it pass
on all the elements of the plan, or only on those affecting the public interest?
Under the provisions of Section 77 the Commission passes on every clement of
the plan. Its findings are final in that the court cannot approve a plan which has
not had the approval of the Commission. 6 Two objections have been urged against
this arrangement: that it tends to create delay by requiring a concurrence of both
tribunals and that it makes the Commission's decision final on what are purely
judicial questions. It is argued that while the Commission might properly have such
authority with reference to the determination of the capital structure., the allocation'
of securities involves merely private rights, with reference to which the Commission
(a nonjudicial body) should act merely as adviser or, as provided in S. x869,37 should
not function at all.
The first objection has merit. While in the simple cases which thus far have
reached the courts, the Commission has acquiesced at once in the courts' modifications of the Commission's plans, yet it would seem that, in a complicated case, the
necessity of agreement on every point of the plan might well produce substantial
and embarrassing delay. It seems appropriate that, with reference to the provisions
dealing with the allocation of securities, the court should have the power to modify
the plan as the evidence or law may require, without a reference back to the Commission.
As to the second of these objections: As intimated in our opening paragraphs, the
fact determinations underlying the prescription of a proper capital structure-these
being the elements of the plan affecting the public interest-are nevertheless of a
technical character. They involve an understanding of the earning power of the
property and of its parts, which is provable ordinarily by complicated and quite
unsatisfactory formulae and other evidence which bears upon the severance and contributive value of mortgaged divisions, and the appraisement of terminals and
leased lines. These questions are complicated with the consideration of the fairness
of through-rate divisions, rate adjustments, the adequacy of maintenance, and various
accounting problems. It is probably appropriate that the Commission's findings
should be protected by presumptions, as far as due process permits, and be subjected
only to a limited review by the court. This was the effect of the amendments proposed by S. i869'8 and H. R. 9447. *
Both bills, however, place the allocation among the claimants of the securities
authorized by the prescribed capital structure in a different.category on the assump"' Id. art. XIX, pp. 6x.65.
o577(d).
d
S
.d.,
so S77(d), as amended by S. A869, P. 40.

"Id. 5852, p.

x6.

as amended by S. r869, p. 4?.
2iH. P- 9447, .943, P. 47.
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tion that the allocation involves primarily legal questions of private right. Thus,
S. 1869 deprives the Commission of any power or duty to pass upon such allocations, 4' and H. R. 9447 leaves the Commission merely in an advisory position.'
These proposals rest on a distinction that is more plausible than real. In the allocation
of the securities certain legal questions involving questions of private right arc
involved, of which the best examples are such as pertain to the priority of liens and
the difficult questions arising as to the scope of after-acquired property clauses. These
questions of law are, however, questions which can be certified by the Commission
to the court under S. 1869,42 the Chandler Draft,4 3 and H. R. 9447.4 Actually, the
allocation of securities in many cases rests as much on the kind of technical fact
determinations just described as does the determination of the capital structure. The
treatment, for example, to be accorded the securities protected by a lien on the
segment of a line covered by a particular mortgage rests in determinations of exactly
that character.
It is, furthermore, apparent that there are practical difficulties in the proposed arrangement whereby the Commission shall make a finding in abstract with reference
to the permissible capitalization and the amount of securities of the respective classes
of securities which are allowed, without regard for (or as specifically provided by
S. 1869, with the definite injunction not to consider) what type of securities are
required for allocation to the various claimants. The cloth is required to be cut
without regard for the size or shape of the shoulders or arms'which the parts of the
coat are to be made to fit, and the judgment of the Commission is thwarted through
its being forbidden to observe the whole problem.
These considerations lead us to believe that the Commission should pass on all
the provisions of the plan. Certainly any court should be glad to have, and we
believe should not be deprived of, the advice of this experienced and skilled authority
with reference to the allocation of the securities to the security holders, since their
rights depend directly upon the valuation of the whole property and of the part to
which their lien pertains--questions lying in technical considerations not ordinarily
within the scope of much consideration by the courts and of the same sort as those
which govern the determination of the capital structure. Under such circumstances,
when the Commission 'is'now thoroughly skilled and staffed and has had long
experience with the problem at hand, there is much to be said in favor of providing
that its fact findings with reference to both types of questions should be protected by
the same presumption and should not be upset if sustained by substantial evidence.
Whether so protected or not, the courts, we believe, will hesitate to disturb such fact
findings, in view of the complexity of the cases, the size of the records, and the
prestige of the Commission. The court would always be free to upset any plan not
sound from the standpoint of legal principles.
,o S7 7 (d), as amended by S. 1869, p. 41.
'"H

R. 9447, 1949, P. 48, 5951, P. 49.

" Chandler Draft, S843, p. 18.

"S.

869, I2, p. 78.

"H.

R. 9447, 5843, P. 14.
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In any consideration, however, of procedural reforms, it would be a mistake to
believe that intelligence and expedition necessarily will be produced by such adjustments. Progress frequently lies, it is true, in defeating retrogression-in the defeat,
as in the instance of S. 1869, of proposals having their foundation in the aim to
secure certain ends at the sacrifice of principles which are more important. For the
time, a mere rearrangement of forms and functions may stimulate the expression of
a greater intelligence and efficiency, just as the stirring up of a feather bed may
temporarily make it better serve its purpose. But in the end, a renovation of procedure is no substitute for the sense of rightness and the intelligence of the able
judge or commissioner. Plainly, real progress in procedural reform lies in what can
be done to light the consciousness of those men who administer, and, in a very real
sense, are, the law itself and its enforcement. It is the spirit that quickeneth and the
statutory letter is no substitute for that life.

